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ABSTRACT The campaign to Open Up the West that started in 2000 has been
presented as a major state project of nation-building directed at the interior provin-
cial-level jurisdictions in order to encourage endogenous economic growth, to reduce
socio-economic inequalities, and to ensure social and political stability in non-Han
areas of the PRC. Despite appearances to the contrary it is more of an adjustment to
the PRC’s regional development policy than a radical change, not least because of
debate and imprecision about its goals, processes and finance. Its impact is perhaps
best viewed from provincial and local perspectives. These stress not only the
importance of the west’s varied social and economic ecology, but also the
significance of the sub-provincial as a focus for analysis.
The announcement of a campaign to “Open Up the West” (xibu da kaifa)
by the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the second
half of 1999 indicated a change in the regional development policy of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC). The stated goal was the development
of the interior and western regions of the PRC, in distinct contrast to the
emphasis of regional development policy since 1978 that had favoured its
eastern and southern parts. On the surface this change and its likely
consequences seem both considerable and significant, suggesting nothing
less than a major state project to ensure greater equality across the
territory of the PRC, to increase state capacity and to assist dramatically
in the process of nation-building. On the other hand, even in the short
period since its inception the aims and content of the campaign have often
appeared not just complex but also imprecise and hostage to the various
elements within the PRC’s decision-making process. In particular, the
processes and intended outcomes of the campaign to Open Up the West
have been matters of some contestation, not least at the provincial-level
and locally. While a national perspective may reveal certain aspects of the
causes, processes and potential impact of this campaign, the diversity of
the socio-economic environment to be found in the newly defined west
region suggests that there is also a need for more provincial-level and
local perspectives.
The Dimensions of Change
In mid-1999 both Jiang Zemin (the then PRC President and CCP
General Secretary) and Zhu Rongji (then Premier of the State Council)
announced that the campaign to Open Up the West would start at the
beginning of 2000. The stated goals were the social and economic
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development of the interior and western regions of the PRC, now seen as
having become unacceptably disadvantaged by the growth strategy of the
previous 20 years. At first sight, the extent of change presaged by this
campaign seems to be considerable.1 The PRC’s tripartite regional devel-
opmental policy throughout the reform era had previously privileged the
coastal economies, as against the central and western regions.2 After 1978
the eastern and southern region was targeted as the focus of industrializa-
tion, and was intended to develop fastest, largely building on its per-
ceived comparative advantage of proximity to the wider East Asian
economies and the outside world. While there had been an expectation
that at some time the western region would also develop, not least in the
wake of growth on the eastern seaboard, for the previous two decades its
role had been as a primary producer to the rest of the country.
The change in the PRC’s regional development policy signalled by the
call to Open Up the West seems to suggest not simply that resources
would be directed to the PRC’s interior and the western region, but also
that there was now to be a higher degree of state intervention in economic
development than had so far characterized the reform era. The previous
20 years had been dominated by an emphasis on the importance of market
forces in the determination of both economic development generally and
regional development more particularly. For some of the regions now to
be designated as part of the “west” to begin closing the gap in economic
performance with the provinces of the eastern seaboard there would need
to be not only a major state project but also a massive concentration of
resources, if indeed it were possible at all. From a provincial perspective,
during the 1990s GDP per capita in Guizhou, the poorest provincial-level
jurisdiction was only a twelfth of that in Shanghai, the richest.3 Indeed,
the change in policy direction and the suggestion of a large-scale diver-
sion of resources even seems similar to the ill-fated “Third Front”
regional development policy of the late 1960s and early 1970s that sought
to develop a military-industrial heartland away from the PRC’s northern
borders and eastern coastline.4
Despite these indications of dramatic change there is also a need for
greater perspective in assessing the intent, processes and potential impact
of the campaign to Open Up the West. In the first place, while two
decades of economic reform had certainly seen an emphasis on the
1. Yasuo Onishi (ed.), China’s Western Development Strategy: Issues and Prospects
(Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, December 2001); H.H. Lai, “China’s western
development program: its rationale, implementation, and prospects,” Modern China, Vol. 28,
No. 4 (October 2002), pp. 432–466.
2. Kjeld Allan Larsen, Regional Policy of China 1949–85 (Manila: Journal of
Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1992); and David S. G. Goodman (ed.), China’s Regional
Development (London: Routledge, 1989).
3. Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, The Political Economy of Uneven Development:
The Case of China (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 200; Other indicators are also
discussed in Joseph Y. S. Cheng and Zhang Mujin,, “An analysis of regional differences in
China and the delayed development of the central and western regions,” Issues and Studies,
Vol. 34, No. 2 (February 1998), p. 35.
4. Barry Naughton, “The Third Front: defence industrialization in the Chinese interior,”
The China Quarterly, No. 115 (September 1988), p. 351.
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importance of market forces, this had not been an exclusive demand of
the central leadership, as the development of Shanghai and particularly
Pudong during the 1990s bears ample witness. As with the introduction
of economic liberalism in Britain during the 19th century, a balance has
been established between state and market with specific roles ascribed to
each, rather than the replacement of all state economic activity by the
market.
In any case, and of greater importance, as the relevant sections of the
Tenth Five-year Plan detail, the new emphasis on the interior is intended
more as an addendum to the current regional development strategy than
its replacement.5 Moreover, far from an all-out redirection of state
resources to the development of the western region, it seems that such
investment has been distinctly limited, and mostly for specific projects
where funding was already identified before the campaign was publicly
articulated. The stated intention has been that further additional funds will
be invested in the western region from private and foreign sources,
though there is as yet no evidence that this tactic will prove successful.
The apparent relative shortage of resources to support the development
of the western region is matched by the lack of coherent and consistent
statements that detail the campaign. There is no single policy document
that summarizes the drive to Open Up the West. Policy of course is
always as much about implementation as design and neither aspect can be
considered in isolation. In this case, though, the Open Up the West policy
appears more general and aspirational than planned in detail, with every
appearance of having emerged from a series of parallel and sometimes
competing agendas.6 There are some specific passages in the Tenth
Five-year Plan, but the call to Open Up the West pre-dates this and the
Plan makes no attempt to be comprehensive in dealing with all the issues
mentioned elsewhere as essential parts of the wider campaign. Questions
of increasing inequality and relative socio-economic (dis)advantage be-
tween the coastal and interior regions were highlighted in the Tenth
Five-year Plan as the prime reason for developing the western regions.
On the other hand, statements by CCP leaders, and discussion (official
and otherwise) in the media have often placed the emphasis on develop-
ing state capacity and nation-building, especially as it relates to the
integration of those non-Han Chinese found in many (though by no
means all) parts of the interior and western provinces.
Any problems with policy clarity have certainly not been assisted by
the repeated changes in the geographical focus of the new “west” region,
as well as its complexity. Neither the boundaries nor the identity of the
west are immediately clear. At the start of the reform era it had been
defined in terms of nine provincial-level jurisdictions: the Xinjiang
Uighur, Tibetan and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Regions, and the
5. Office of the Premier, State Council of the PRC, Outline of the Tenth Five-year
National Economic and Social Development Plan of the People’s Republic of China (Draft)
5 March 2001, in New China News Agency Report, 5 March 2001, ch. 8, s. 1.
6. David S. G. Goodman, “The politics of the west: equality, nation-building and
colonisation,” Provincial China, Vol. 7, No. 2 (December 2002).
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provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou.
The first articulations of the new policy to Open Up the West during late
1999 defined it in terms of these provincial-level jurisdictions plus the
more recently (1997) established Chongqing Municipality. However,
from about October 2000 the west came to be defined in terms of 12
provincial-level units, with the addition of the Inner Mongolia and
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Regions. In September 2001 the Xiangxi
Tujia-Miao Autonomous Prefecture, Hunan, the Enshi Tujia-Miao Auton-
omous Prefecture, Hubei and the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefec-
ture, Jilin were also added.7
To some extent this uncertainty about the boundaries of the west
reflects the wider imprecision about its identity as a region. The rhetoric
of policy debate in the PRC would suggest that it was characterized by
economic underdevelopment, a lack of economic infrastructure and large
numbers of minority nationalities, as well as being in the far interior of
the land mass. While it is quite clear that the west, as now defined, has
from the perspective of the provincial level some of the greatest concen-
trations of poverty, ethnic minorities and poor economic infrastructure in
the PRC, a description in these terms highlights neither common nor
exclusive characteristics. Moreover, while most of its areas are away
from the coastline, this is quite clearly not the case for the Guangxi
Zhuang Autonomous Region, which has a southern coastline.
The provincial-level jurisdictions in the west are generally socially and
economically disadvantaged, but they are not exclusively so, and they are
not all equally disadvantaged. Table 1 provides comparative data on the
socio-economic development of the west by provincial-level jurisdiction.
Many of the same difficulties of disadvantage are also faced by the
provinces of Anhui, Jiangxi and Shanxi,8 while in contrast in the west the
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region was an economic success story
throughout the 1990s. By the end of the decade it could claim a higher
GDP per capita than (amongst others) Hainan or Jilin provinces, the
former supposedly at the forefront of the new investment environment in
south China, and the latter a centre of earlier industrialization.9 Moreover,
by any standard it would appear that some provincial-level jurisdictions
– the Tibet Autonomous Region and Guizhou and Qinghai provinces
provide clear examples – are substantially worse off not simply in terms
of economic growth data (which often do not adequately reflect the
degree of disadvantage) but also with respect to the provision of welfare
(notably health and education) than others in the west. The problems
faced by the leaderships of provincial-level jurisdictions with long-estab-
7. Heike Holbig’s article in this volume.
8. Sun Wanning, “Anhui: the institutionalisation of poverty,” in John Fitzgerald (ed.),
Rethinking China’s Provinces (London: Routledge, 2002); and David S. G. Goodman, “King
Coal and Secretary Hu: Shanxi’s third modernisation,” and Feng Chongyi, “Jiangxi in reform:
the fear of exclusion and the search for a new identity,” both in Hans Hendrischke and Feng
Chongyi (eds.), The Political Economy of China’s Provinces: Comparative and Competitive
Advantage (London: Routledge, 1999).
9. Statistics unless otherwise indicated are from National Bureau of Statistics, PRC China
Statistical Yearbook 2002 (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2002).
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lished industrial bases, such as Sichuan, Shaanxi and Chongqing Munici-
pality, are serious enough but they are more commensurate with those
being faced elsewhere (outside the west) in the PRC.
A similar variability attends the characterization of the west in terms of
its non-Han population. Given the apparent growth dynamic of the new
region since 1999, which suggests that the campaign may be targeted at
minority nationality populations, it may come as a surprise to find that
these are not confined to the west. There are significant minority national-
ity populations in the north-east, in Hainan province, and elsewhere in the
central provinces of the PRC and even along the eastern seaboard. In any
case, even within the west the proportions and concentrations of minority
nationality populations vary greatly. The Tibetan Autonomous Region
(96 per cent), the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (62 per cent) and
Qinghai province (46 per cent) all have considerable populations of
minority nationalities, while Gansu (8 per cent) Sichuan (5 per cent) and
Shaanxi (0.5 per cent) provinces have relatively few. Moreover, there is
an almost inherent variability to the concentration of different groups of
minority nationalities, even where a substantial proportion of the popu-
lation is so classified. Almost all those in the Tibet Autonomous Region
are Tibetan, and those in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region are
mainly either Uighurs or Kazakhs, but in Qinghai, Yunnan and Guizhou
provinces there are large numbers of different minority nationality
groups.
As these remarks suggest, there are significant social, economic and
political differences to be found not only across but also within each of
the west’s various provincial-level jurisdictions. Indeed, while the
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities (cities directly subordi-
nated to central government) may be a convenient focus for examination
of the development of the west, not least because of the administrative
hierarchy of the state, they are not necessarily the only units of analysis.
A focus on the provincial level helps explain certain aspects of political
activity, especially the interaction with the party-state’s planning for the
development of the west. On the other hand, as the following studies
make abundantly clear, a focus on sub-provincial level regions, social
groups, economic interests and even minority nationalities all highlight
other aspects of both more local political dynamics and socio-economic
development in the west.
In addition, the boundaries of provincial-level and indeed other admin-
istrative jurisdictions are often significantly less important for some
activities than others. While the disjuncture between areas of economic
activity and the state’s administrative boundaries has long been recog-
nized,10 in the west this is most obviously the case for the existence and
operation of the cultures of the various minority nationalities. All five of
the PRC’s autonomous regions and many of its other minority nationality
areas of self-government are now located in the west, yet few minority
10. Joseph B. R. Whitney, China: Area, Administration, and Nation Building (Chicago:
The University of Chicago, Department of Geography, Research Paper No. 123, 1969).
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nationalities dominate the autonomous areas that bear their name socially
let alone politically, and almost all are to be found in more than one
administrative jurisdiction.
Any assessment of the potential impact and consequences of the
campaign to Open Up the West needs to address the inherent diversity
and variety to be found in the west. Certainly it needs to address the
specific responses from the leadership of each provincial-level jurisdic-
tion to the call to Open Up the West and the ways in which these interact
with wider goals and aspirations. Provincial-level jurisdictions have not
only formulated their involvement in the new Five-year Plan (of which
the call to Open Up the West forms but one part) but have also started to
implement policies and initiatives explicitly framed in the context of the
programme of western development. At the same time an assessment also
needs to take account of the social and economic environment at more
local, sub-provincial-level levels in order to assess the interaction with
the processes of change now under way that may result.
State and Nation-building
The difficulties in describing, and sometimes even discovering, the
detail of the campaign to Open Up the West are matched by those
concerned with its explanation. The social sciences contain a large
lexicon of concepts and terms related to the expansion of space for social,
economic and political activity. Their application in this context is
entirely appropriate, even where meanings are contested, though some-
times there may also be unnecessary confusion, especially from cross and
interdisciplinary perspectives. The notion of integration, which would
generally appear to be at the heart of the campaign to Open Up the West,
provides a simple but excellent example. Political scientists emphasize
the associative aspects of integration as a process that brings entities
together organizationally. On the other hand, economists usually regard
integration as a process that removes the barriers to interaction. More-
over, as Solinger has pointed out through work on south-west China,
there are two dimensions to integration: a need to consider the ways a
locality is integrated in itself, and within the wider system of which it is
part. Though these two processes often go together they may also occur
separately.11
The campaign to Open Up the West has most usually been described,
both inside the PRC and even outside (to the limited extent that a
literature has started to emerge), in terms of its capacity to build the state
and the nation. Particularly since the emergence of modern European
nationalism, and with its later development in the 20th century, state and
nation have often been equated to such an extent that contemporary states
are frequently referred to as “nation-states” regardless of their ethnic
composition. The equation is understandable given that one of the tasks
11. Dorothy J. Solinger, Regional Government and Political Integration in Southwest
China, 1949–54 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
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of the nation-state so identified has been to ensure the creation of the
nation through a process of standardization and homogenization12; and
that the establishment of a nation-state became during the 20th century a
marker of modernization for the countries and societies of the less
developed world, as in China. An insistence on the description of a
nation-state thus became central to the claim to sovereignty.
While to insist on a strict separation between state and nation would be
both extreme and even to some extent misleading, they are not identical
concepts. Generally speaking, and certainly within the broad field of
China studies, the concept of “state” is used to refer to the infrastructure
of government and administration. More specifically it may relate to one
of three inter-related concepts: the “state idea” and its attendant power
configurations in society; the system of governance of a society; and
specific ruling authorities.13 In contrast, the concept of nation is more
concerned with the characteristics of the population, and specifically their
ethnicity, often seen as (and discourse is crucial) defined by a shared
language, social customs and patterns of behaviour.14 Where a people
living in a political system may be assumed to share a common ethnicity
or to be in the process of developing a common identity then the
analytical constructs of state and nation begin to converge, especially
where the state idea includes that common identity.
At the same time, such is the sophistry of 20th-century politics, there
is apparently no need for a nation-state to be based on a single nation.
Essentially citizenship has come to be read as nationality for the basis of
membership in the nation-state. This ambiguity helps to some extent to
explain the position of contemporary Chinese nationalism, and
specifically of the PRC, which would appear for different political
reasons to embrace simultaneously the discourse of both the nation-state
and multi-nationalism. The former emphasizes the commitment to econ-
omic development and modernization; the latter emphasizes the state’s
intended inclusivity towards that 8 per cent of the population who are
recognized as (minority) nationalities other than Han Chinese. In the view
of the state, a citizen of the PRC is in some sense a national (guomin)
whether they are Han Chinese or not. Necessarily the viability of this
position depends on the extent to which the state-idea of the PRC is
accepted in the population itself, both Han Chinese and other nationalities
(minzu.)
State building and nation-building may then be seen as two different
but closely inter-related processes. Where state building emphasizes the
development of the infrastructure of government and administration –
12. At the same time, it is probably only in Belgium of all the West European countries
where the prior existence of state to nation is acknowledged and celebrated to some extent.
13. James Cotton, “The limits to liberalization in industrializing Asia: three views of the
state,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 3 (1991).
14. Ernest Gellner, Culture, Identity and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987); Homi Bhaba, Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1990); Benedict
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New
York: Verso, 1991, revised ed.).
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including of course not only bureaucracy (as both organization and
process) but also communications, some aspects of economic infrastruc-
ture, and the state’s extractive capacity and redistributive mechanisms –
nation-building emphasizes the forging of a common identity. Just as the
emergence of a common identity and feelings of solidarity assist in the
process of state-building, so too the development of state capacity may
assist in unifying the population. On the other hand, these are complex
processes and there can be no guarantee that state and nation-building
will proceed in mutually reinforcing ways, particularly where different
nationality identities intervene.15
Interestingly, discussions of the campaign to Open Up the West in the
PRC have polarized around one view that emphasizes state-building, and
another which not only highlights the importance of nation-building but
sometimes aggressively promotes homogenization. Much of the intellec-
tual justification for the campaign came from two reports written to the
State Council by academics Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang during the
1990s, which highlighted the adverse impact of the PRC’s post-1978
economic policy on the regions of the interior.16 Against the background
of the East Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s and the PRC’s
planned entry to the WTO it is not hard to see the attraction of a
campaign to Open Up the West to a range of different constituencies
within the party-state, all interested in the expansion of state capacity, if
in different ways.
Neither Wang Shaoguang nor Hu Angang, nor any of those writing or
speaking later, ignored the diversity of nationalities that is to be found in
the west. Indeed, speaking on the topic on his Government Work Report
of March 2000, Zhu Rongji made it plain that “common prosperity”
would result in the “strengthening of national unity, safeguarding of
social stability, and consolidation of border defence,”17 all of which were
barely coded phrases for being concerned about issues surrounding the
non-Han Chinese. At the same time, there have been considerably more
focused comments from some observers and officials about the need to
ensure a higher degree of social homogenization, particularly in terms of
the civilizing influence of Chinese culture on the non-Han peoples, in the
development of the west. Writing in June 2000, Li Dezhu from the State
Ethnic Affairs Commission emphasized the backwardness of the minority
nationalities and their need to learn from the more advanced culture of the
15. Fred W. Riggs, “Ethnonationalism, industrialism and the modern state,” Third World
Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 4 (December 1994), p. 583.
16. Published versions of these reports are: Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang, Zhongguo
guojia nengli baogao (A Report on China’s State Capacity) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin
chubanshe, 1993), translated as, “Strengthening central government’s leading role amid
China’s transition to a market economy,” Chinese Economic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3
(May-June 1995), and No. 4 (July-August 1995); and Hu Angang, Wang Shaoguang and Kang
Xiaoguang, Zhongguo diqu chaju baogao (A Report on Regional Disparities in China)
(Shenyand: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1995). An English-language version of the second
report has been published as Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang The Political Economy of
Uneven Development: The Case of China (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999).
17. Premier Zhu Rongji’s Government Work Report for 2000 to the third session of the
Ninth National People’s Congress, 5 March 2000, in China Daily, 6 March 2000.
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Han Chinese.18 While it is clear (not least from Zhu Rongji’s comments)
that there were concerns about challenges to the integrity of the PRC in
the wake of developments in Central Asia and Yugoslavia after the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the aims of this kind of nation-build-
ing go far beyond securing borders towards greater assimilation.
This discussion of the relationship between core and periphery leads
inevitably to consideration of the application of terms such as colonial-
ism, internal colonialism and colonization to the development of China’s
west. These concepts entail the expansion of a society’s core area of
activity, often through the movement of people from the core to the
(newly established, as part of the development process) periphery. More
contentiously they also indicate the expropriation of the periphery to the
greater benefit of the core.
The campaign to Open Up the West would generally seem to have
something in common with a colonial enterprise or colonization project,
and in certain areas (such as Xinjiang) to have much in common with the
colonial experience elsewhere in the world. Within the PRC such endeav-
ours are clearly seen as part and parcel of the developmental processes of
state and nation-building in the core (the eastern and coastal regions) as
much as in the periphery (the west.) As already noted, through the work
of Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang the west was clearly identified to the
leadership of the PRC as a significant region of underdevelopment.
Moreover, the strategy for change also includes a rhetoric of pioneering
to Open Up the West, and the movement of activists in that regard from
the eastern seaboard to the western regions. One aim was clearly to
reverse the flow of internal migration, which during the 1980s and 1990s
had seen workers travelling from the regions of the interior to the eastern
and coastal economies in large numbers in search of employment and
wealth.19 According to a member of the State Council, “the phenomenon
of ‘the peacock flying to the south-east’ ” – as this migration was
characterized – will be replaced by the “phenomenon of the ‘peacock
flying west’.”20
The pejorative and politicized associations of colonial interpretations
do though mean that they are generally unacceptable within the PRC.
Although some have tried to present terms such as colonialism, internal
colonialism and colonization dispassionately, they are all emotive and
politically charged. The history of the concepts of colonialism (as in
Lenin’s analysis of European capital’s outward expansion), through
internal colonization (of the United States’ westward movement), to the
identification of internal colonialism (in Britain’s Celtic fringes, as well
as South Africa and the countries of Latin America during the 1960s and
1970s) indicates – amongst other things – expropriation or exclusive use
18. Li Dezhu, “Large-scale development of western China and China’s nationality
problems,” Qiushi (Seeking Truth), 1 June 2000, in FBIS, 15 June 2000.
19. Delia Davin, Internal Migration in Contemporary China (London: Macmillan, 1999);
Loraine A. West and Yaohui Zhao (eds.), Rural Labor Flows in China (Berkeley: University
of California, 2000).
20. Li Dezhu, “Large-scale development of western China.”
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of land and resources, and the subjugation of one (or several) people by
another (or conceivably others).21 Such concerns sit uncomfortably with
the worldview of any communist party, and the PRC would also in all
probability regard any such interpretation as a challenge to its integrity.
All the same this has (somewhat paradoxically) not stopped the model of
internal colonization that took place in the 19th-century development of
the United States being explicitly discussed and favourably regarded in
the context of the campaign to Open Up the West.22
Even outside the PRC the negative connotations necessarily mask any
more positive aspects of colonialism and colonization. Both individually
and socially colonialism may bring elements of social and economic
improvement to the periphery, regardless of the relationship to the core
and the extent to which the political centre dominates. The greater
provision of educational opportunities is, in general, one obvious way in
which colonial powers have contributed to the development of the
periphery, even if this may often be regarded as a forced socialization
into the values and society of the core and remains resented.23 Moreover,
a process of colonization led from the political centre may even be
preferable to a policy of forcing the periphery to depend on its own
resources for its development. This was certainly the case for Guizhou
under the PRC as before and (adversely) after the change in regional
development policy associated with the Great Leap Forward.24
At the heart of these concerns is the question of which national identity
is privileged, and under what conditions. In the PRC, as already noted,
national identity is technically not the same as nationality. Since the
1950s the PRC has officially recognized 56 nationalities – the Han
Chinese and 55 minority nationalities – as part of its definition of national
identity. Yet, it would appear that this multiculturalism is somewhat more
limited than that practised in some other political systems.
In the first place, the history of the state in China (as it became known
during the 20th century) suggests a certain dynamic relationship as well
as tension between identity as a subject of the Emperor or citizen, and
identity in terms of Han Chinese culture.25 Full social and political
acceptance as the former entailed the latter. As the remarks already noted
21. Andre Gundar Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1969); Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in
British National Development 1536–1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975);
B. Potter, R. Binns, T. Elliott and S. Smith, Understanding Colonialism (London: Longman,
1999.
22. See, for example, China Western Development Research Institute, Shaanxi, Lun xibu
da kaifa (On “Open Up the West”) (Hangzhou: Zhejiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000).
23. See, for example, Truong Buu Lam, Colonialism Experienced: Vietnamese Writings
on Colonialism 1900–1931 (Chicago: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Lora Wildenthal,
German Women for Empire, 1884–1945 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).
24. David S. G. Goodman, “Guizhou and the People’s Republic of China: the development
of an internal colony,” in D. Drakakis-Smith and S. William (eds.), Internal Colonialism:
Essays Around a Theme (Edinburgh: IBG Development Areas Research Group Monograph
No. 3, Edinburgh University, 1983), pp. 107–124.
25. Stevan Harrell, “Introduction,” in Melissa J. Brown (ed.), Negotiating Ethnicities in
China and Taiwan (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1996).
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by Li Dezhu bear witness, it seems likely that the current Chinese state
continues the belief of its predecessors in recognizing a civilizing impera-
tive in Han Chinese culture.26
In the second place, while the categories of nationality employed in the
PRC clearly bear some relationship to ethnicity, they are not identical.
The 56 nationality designations are constructs of the state for managing
its perceived problems and nationality policy. For the non-Han Chinese
population the official nationality designation may well be part of their
negotiation of ethnicity and identity, but they are not the sole determi-
nant. At the local level, as Harrell (amongst others) has pointed out,
ethnic identity is considerably more fluid for most minority nationality
people.27 For the Han Chinese too their categorization as a nationality
imposes a layer of identity that is not quite a total explanation of
ethnicity, if with perhaps a longer historical justification for the catego-
rization.28
The tension between local and national constructions of identity high-
light (once again) the importance of appreciating the scales of interaction
involved in the campaign to Open Up the West. As already noted, there
are interactions at, and amongst, the local, sub-provincial and provincial-
level in the west, as well as between the west and both the central
government and other regions in the PRC. In addition, the processes of
state and nation-building within the PRC have wider international and
transnational contexts.
Ideationally, the campaign to Open Up the West is shaped by specific
notions of modernization and socio-economic development that only
partly come from the heritage of communism. The PRC’s senses of
international position and purpose helped determine the articulation of the
campaign as a major state project, explicitly compared to other grand
state projects (and regardless of their eventual success) such as Russia’s
development of Siberia, Japan’s resurgence after defeat in the Pacific
War, and the development of poor inland areas in Brazil and India during
the 1950s.29 Interestingly some other possible comparisons such as Qing
expansion and Japan’s developmental project in Manchuria do not feature
in this analysis30; and while California is widely seen as a suitable model
for emulation and the result of the United States’ push to develop its west,
26. Suzanne Ogden, Inklings of Democracy in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2002), pp. 21ff; Chih-yu Shih, Negotiating Ethnicity in China: Citizenship
as a Response to the State (London: Routledge), pp. 2ff.
27. Most recently, Stevan Harrell, Ways of Being Ethnic in Southwest China (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 2001). See also Katherine Palmer Kaup, Creating the
Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).
28. Patricia Ebrey, “Surnames and Han Chinese identity,” in Brown, Negotiating
Ethnicities in China and Taiwan; David S. G. Goodman, “Centre and periphery after 20 years
of reform: redefining the Chinese polity,” China Perspectives, No. 31 (September-October
2000).
29. China Western Development Research Institute, Shaanxi, On “Open Up the West.”
30. Thomas Scharping, “The integration of Manchuria: political change, demographic
development, and ethnic structure from the early Qing period to present times (1610–1993),”
in Lutz Bieg, Erling von Mende and Martina Siebert (eds.), Ad Seres et Tungosos: Festschrift
fu¨r Martin Gimm (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2000), p. 343.
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no mention is made of that landmass’s seashore. Economically, it also
seems likely that the more short-term causes of the decision to develop
the west included the probable onset of WTO membership and the late
1990s financial crisis in East Asia.
In more immediate terms the world outside the PRC has been seen as
crucial to the campaign. A large part of the planning for the development
of the west has assumed that foreign direct investment would be forth-
coming from the East Asian region, and finance through aid projects from
the more developed world. Almost every provincial-level jurisdiction in
the west has arranged trade fairs and visits from potential investors during
2001–2002. Some provinces, such as Yunnan, have made the earning of
foreign exchange through aid projects and related NGO projects a central
part of their economic development strategy.31 It would be misleading
though to see aid or investment as a one-way process.
Provincial and Local Perspectives
The following contributions consider the introduction and potential
impact of the campaign to Open Up the West. After Heike Holbig’s
consideration of its emergence through national politics, there are seven
specific studies of local and provincial-level interaction with the cam-
paign. In particular, there are three studies of the north-west and four of
the south-west. In the north-west, Nicolas Becquelin examines the Xin-
jiang Uighur Autonomous Region, David Goodman considers Qinghai
province and Eduard Vermeer discusses Shaanxi. In the south-west,
Christopher McNally discusses the development of Sichuan and Lijian
Hong the relatively new provincial-level Chongqing Municipality, previ-
ously subordinated to Sichuan province. Elsewhere in the south-west,
Tim Oakes is concerned with Guizhou, and Ralph Litzinger with north-
west Yunnan.
A study of this kind cannot hope to be comprehensive in its treatment
of the campaign to Open Up the West, not least because of its relative
novelty. With the passage of time it is hoped that the issues it raises will
set the research agenda for the future, and eventually through the
emergence of more local and provincial-level studies contribute to a
wider understanding of both the campaign and the processes of social and
political change in the regions of the west. At this stage, the focus has
been on providing a wide overview of the range of change to provide a
framework for further research. Even so there are several aspects of social
and political change in the regions of the west, and in the interactions
with the rest of the PRC, that are clearly absent. These include consider-
ations of gender, sexual politics, ideology, symbolism and popular cul-
ture. More generally, as is almost inevitable at this stage of analysis, just
over three years since its introduction, there is a tendency to concentrate
31. Ingrid d’Hooghe, “Regional economic integration in Yunnan,” in David S. G.
Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds.), China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism
(London: Routledge, 1994), p. 286.
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on the advantages to be found from the campaign to Open Up the West
and the activities of those who have benefited. Yet all processes of social
and economic change also have losers and disadvantages, whose exist-
ence may take longer to appear.
In her discussion of the formation of the campaign to Open Up the
West at the national level of politics, Heike Holbig emphasizes the extent
to which it has become “soft policy” capable of appealing to as many
decision-makers as possible without necessarily committing large
amounts of resources. She describes how the ideological underpinnings of
the CCP before the late 1990s bequeathed a legacy of commitment to
develop the “interior.” This commitment became a more acute political
reality after the extent of increasing socio-economic inequality between
coastal and inland China during the 1980s became clear to senior CCP
leaders, particularly as concerns grew in Beijing about both the possible
impact of the PRC’s entry to the WTO and the potential for increased
ethno-political conflict in non-Han areas of the country. Imprecision and
uncertainty about the campaign directs attention to provincial-level and
local implementation of policy to Open Up the West.
Although the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region is widely regarded
as the outlier in terms of the economic performance of provincial-level
jurisdictions in the west during the 1980s and 1990s, this was achieved
under somewhat unusual circumstances. As Nicolas Becquelin details,
Xinjiang was and is the object of colonization by the state, through the
agency of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. The cam-
paign to Open Up the West has heralded a consolidation of state and
nation-building by the centre in this part of its periphery. For Xinjiang the
most significant change wrought by the campaign has been that the state’s
agenda has been made more open. This is a display of some considerable
confidence that there may be no counter-reaction, a contestable perspec-
tive in Becquelin’s view.
Qinghai’s social complexity and fragile environment have repeatedly
presented Beijing with significant political and economic problems,
which were then exacerbated by attempted solutions that rapidly proved
over-simplistic and counter-productive. David Goodman details the ways
in which the call to Open Up the West has provided the provincial
leadership with the opportunity to resolve some of the long-term
difficulties through adopting markedly different perspectives on develop-
ment. Nevertheless, he argues that there remains a danger in concentrat-
ing almost exclusively on economic solutions to the province’s problems,
and that its inherent political, social and cultural contestations require
more sophisticated management if wider goals of social stability and
economic development are to be achieved.
Shaanxi does not share many of the newly-defined west’s apparent key
characteristics. It has almost no non-Han peoples and a relatively long
experience of industrial development. As Eduard Vermeer argues, its
interaction with the campaign to Open Up the West is best seen as the
latest in a series of attempts to bring the province, and its role as a
gateway to the rest of north-west China, into closer proximity to the rest
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of the national economy. To this end the province has received consider-
able central financial support. While this may prove efficacious, es-
pecially in dealing with the consequences of restructuring state-owned
enterprises, it may not provide a sustainable development strategy in the
longer term. Further doubts about the impact of current policy, as
Vermeer details, relate to the need for a more differentiated approach to
the development of each of the province’s three sub-regions.
Sichuan is the west’s largest provincial-level jurisdiction in terms of
both population and the size of its economy. Although the Sichuan Basin
is an area of historical wealth, the province also contains considerably
poorer mountain areas to the north-east and in the west. In his analysis of
the potential impact of the campaign to Open Up the West on Sichuan,
Christopher McNally focuses on the attempt to reduce the developmental
gap between rich and poor within the province. He concludes that in this
particular regard the results have been mixed: some positive results are
starting to be felt in mountainous districts, but the disproportionate costs
in those areas are high. In particular, as elsewhere in Sichuan, a major
problem is the need for industrial restructuring centred on state-owned
enterprises that are in the main the legacy of the PRC’s Third Front.
Industrial restructuring is also a major problem facing Chongqing
Municipality, and largely for the same reason. As Lijian Hong explains,
Chongqing was separated from Sichuan province and given provincial-
level status in 1997 in large part because of the scale of the problems it
faced with inefficient state-owned enterprises and the intended solutions
to their reform. The construction of the Three Gorges Dam and associated
programmes of population relocation was a second significant part of that
change. However, elevation to the provincial level presented other prob-
lems of economic development and poor performance to its leadership
that have merely sought to underline the extent to which Chongqing is
financially dependent on Beijing. The campaign to Open Up the West has
given it a temporary lifeline by providing additional subsidies, but its
future prosperity depends on their continuation and the leadership’s
ability to manage change.
The West to East Electricity Transfer Project has been the major
feature of the campaign to Open Up the West in Guizhou. Tim Oakes
examines this project in his discussion of Guizhou’s reaction to the
campaign and its potential impact. He highlights the extent to which the
campaign is designed to develop the west, and specifically Guizhou,
economically, for the greater benefit of the provinces to the east and on
the coast. Oakes sees this relationship in the context of the province’s
long history of internal colonization, as well as part of the state’s attempt
to recentralize under the specific conditions of relatively increased prov-
incial autonomy generated by reform since 1978. The concern for
Guizhou is that through its role as a supplier of energy to Guangdong it
may be less able to meet the challenges of diversification that result from
WTO membership.
Ralph Litzinger’s study of an environmental project in north-west
Yunnan, the Yunnan Great Rivers Project, provides a useful counter-
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weight to analysis of the campaign to Open Up the West in a number of
ways. Most importantly it draws attention to transnational influences and
involvement beyond concerns of international finance. At the same time,
it emphasizes themes at an even more local level that have already
emerged in analysing the impact, realized and potential, of the campaign
to Open Up the West: the attempt to colonize non-Han peoples; the
significance of the sub-provincial level of analysis for understanding the
impact of the campaign; the drive to extend the reach of the state; and
local resistance to change, especially when sourced from somewhere else.
Each of the studies looking at the experience of the campaign to Open
Up the West in a provincial-level jurisdiction is clearly specific to its
territory of enquiry. All the same, one of the more obvious conclusions
to emerge overall is confirmation of the usefulness and importance of
proceeding from a provincial-level and local perspective in analysing the
campaign. Without this, the danger of over-generalization is all too
readily apparent. For example, in Xinjiang the campaign to Open Up the
West appears inherently related to the colonization project of the Chinese
state, central to which is an attempt to reduce and sinify the non-Han
proportion of the population. In Qinghai, by contrast, it is clear that there
are different considerations about managing minority nationality popula-
tions. There, without overstating the degree of local community auton-
omy, it is clear that there has been and continues increasingly to be
considerably greater freedom of expression for the non-Han, as well as
severe restrictions on inward migration and an increase in the non-Han
proportion of the population. Another example reinforcing the message to
disaggregate the west rests with consideration of the lack of large-scale
funding, particularly from central government sources, for the scale of
operation suggested by the goals of the campaign to Open Up the West.
This has been and is frequently noted, and in several different localities.
Yet, the absence of such funding has clearly not been the case in
Chongqing, where by all accounts a large part of the viability of the
municipal leadership rests on its ability to extract central government
subsidies, or in Shaanxi.
At the same time, this overall confirmation should not be taken as a
conclusion about the importance of the provincial level as the only focus
for analysis. Clearly the provincial level plays a central role in political
explanations of change, not least because of the structure of the state.
Nevertheless, it is equally clear that in many ways the sub-provincial may
be at least as significant politically, and is possibly more important in
understanding economic and social interactions. In Sichuan and
Chongqing the poorer, rural and mountain areas pose different challenges
(and interact differently with the campaign to Open Up the West) from
the richer, large metropolitan areas that dominate these provincial-level
jurisdictions. Shaanxi province has three distinct regional geographies
each of whose development requires different management strategies. In
Xinjiang, despite the relative success of the state’s colonization project,
the reactions of the minority nationalities are a crucial other aspect to the
outcome for the region. Ethnic groups and local communities feature in
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the explanation of change and assessment of the impact of the campaign
to Open Up the West in Qinghai and Yunnan. There is the prospect that
the campaign may increase inter-provincial inequalities at the same time
as bringing each provincial jurisdiction’s core closer to Beijing and the
eastern seaboard of the PRC.
The variability of the socio-economic environment across the west
necessarily means that few commonalities have been observed across the
various case studies of the provincial level and the local, and that those
that do begin to emerge should perhaps be highlighted only tentatively at
this stage in research, given the limited number of case studies. One is the
relatively high profile of a discourse of state environmentalism that lurks
within each provincial-level jurisdiction’s engagement with the campaign
to Open Up the West. Undoubtedly part of the genesis for this concern is
Jiang Zemin’s call to construct a “Green Great Wall” from Xinjiang to
Heilongjiang to resist environmental degradation. At the same time, there
can be little doubt that some parts of the party-state at provincial and
local levels may have learnt that there are likely to be environmental
constraints on agendas for development. Another apparent commonality
is the feeling in the west that the major beneficiary of the campaign is
more likely to be the rest of the PRC. This feeling is not always allied to
resistance but it does appear to be quite widespread, even at times within
the leadership of the party-state at provincial and local levels.
In dealing with the PRC social scientists have long faced a difficult
paradox: they would like to use the plentiful statistical data produced in
the PRC to support and illustrate their arguments, yet they recognize there
are inherent difficulties in using official data, not the least of which is
different bases of calculation for apparently similar data.32 Accordingly,
the contributors have attempted to use statistics sparingly, considering
those that explain to be more useful than those that attempt to describe.
In addition, and not least to minimize statistical overload and repetition,
Table 1 provides a comparative summary of some main socio-economic
indicators in the provincial-level jurisdictions of the west, noting where
appropriate national comparators and relativities to elsewhere in the PRC.
32. Carsten Herrmann-Pillath, “Einfuehrung” (“Introduction”), in Wirtschaftliche En-
twicklung in China’s Provinzen und Regionen (Economic Development in China’s Provinces
and Regions) (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995), p. cix.
